I'm not a right-wing Japanese person; in fact, I've felt for over 20 years that Japan needs a powerful intelligence agency. While I think it's too late now, it might be better to have one than not to have one at all.
However, the norm of "necessity" and the ability to "operate it properly" are two different things.
I believe that today's jellyfish-like people, with the faces of chimpanzees and the minds of cockroaches, lack the ability to properly operate an intelligence agency.
What happens when people who lack the "ability" to handle things properly brandish the "norm" of "it's necessary! We should do it! We must do it!"?
We all know this from experience.
It's also difficult to draw the line between "intelligence," "public safety," and "national defense" organizations.
From its inception, the FBI conducted illegal "intelligence" activities. Secretary Hoover investigated all those involved in American "power" and discovered their "weaknesses."
It is well known that he "investigated" Kennedy's ties to the Mafia and his "affair" with Marilyn Monroe (a secret rendezvous in the White House) and used them as "weaknesses," and that he even installed listening devices in President Kennedy's bedroom to eavesdrop on his nighttime "affairs."
After Hoover died, having remained in his "director's" chair for an unusually long period of time, President Nixon ordered the destruction of all the vast amount of material Hoover had left behind.
Nixon's words at the time are also famous.
In a country that was a leader in democracy and freedom, one person had held the power of "information" that was so great that it could topple the nation for such a long period of time.
It is hard to imagine that the Japanese of today, who have become like jellyfish, spineless monkeys, could do something that even the United States and Britain struggle to achieve.
Considering the character, disposition, life experiences, education, communication skills, and sensibilities of today's "Japanese," I would venture to guess that there's a 90% or higher chance that a Japanese version "CIA" will turn into the "Stasi." At best, I think it'll become like the "Tokkō."
Before World War II, Japan's intelligence activities were concentrated in mainland China. The South Manchuria Railway Investigation Department and the Kantō Army's (or Kwantung Army's) various special agencies (Tokumu organ) were primarily responsible for this role. This was related to the Imperial Army's plan to control the continent.
However, within Japan (to be precise, Korea was also part of Japan's "inland" territory; Taiwan and Karafuto were legally (formally) classified as "overseas territories"), security was too lax, and foreign spies were operating in secret (just as it is today).
The Sorge Affair sent shock waves through Japan's military and political circles. Sorge was fluent in Japanese and had skillfully infiltrated the centers of power among Japanese politicians and army officials, allowing Japan's military secrets to be leaked to the Soviet Union. Japan's leaders were all caught off guard.
More than going to war, information is the most important weapon for avoiding war or for ending a war.
The Nomonhan Incident is a good example of this from modern Japan's experience.
At the time of this armed conflict, neither the Kantō Army (Kwantung Army), the Imperial Army General Staff, nor the government received accurate information. It's true that the Japanese Army's mechanization lagged behind that of the Soviet Army, but the Kantō Army (Kwantung Army), supported by extraordinary mental strength and skillful tactics, continued to put up a tenacious resistance and was not defeated by the Soviet army. In fact, it was winning.
However, incorrect information was reaching the Japanese government.
As a result, Stalin at the time was both relieved and pleased. Stalin had accurate information about the battle situation.
It was more than 50 years after the aforementioned armed conflict, when the Soviet Union collapsed and confidential documents from the Soviet era were made public, that Japan obtained the correct information.
As I was painfully aware 14 years ago during the 3/11 disaster (Fukushima nuclear accidents), this insular nation is far too ignorant about information.
On the other hand, I think it was admirable that the Soviet Union (now Russia) stored and preserved the aforementioned confidential documents for over 50 years, and then made them public half a century later.
If the situation were reversed and Japan were in the position, all inconvenient documents would have been destroyed.
Furthermore, Japan had a bitter experience with the issues surrounding President Franklin Roosevelt(FDA) and Secretary of State Hull.
As is now clear from the Venona files, they were surrounded by many Comintern spies (who were, of course, legitimate American citizens) who carried out operations favorable to the Soviet Union. While the US government's laxity was one issue, Japan's intelligence activities to grasp the situation at the center of American power were insufficient.
As a result, President Roosevelt turned down Prime Minister Konoe's proposal for a Japan-US summit meeting and took the worst possible measure: an oil embargo on Japan (Japan was dependent on the US for oil at the time).
Meanwhile, the Japanese also underestimated Roosevelt's reaction to the occupation of southern French Indochina. Just as they had assumed that Roosevelt would not see a problem with the occupation of northern Indochina at the request of the Vichy government, the Japanese were surprised by Roosevelt's strong measures.
American intelligence activities against Japan were also insufficient. The unique nature of Japan's civil-military relations (in an old paper, Huntington conducted a detailed comparative analysis of prewar civil-military relations in the United States, Germany, and Japan. I believe his analysis of Japan is basically correct. However, due to a lack of materials (he had friends translate Japan-related materials into English for him to read. Times were different, so there was a limit to the amount that could be translated, and financial issues were likely also involved) and the language barrier, his analysis may appear insufficient in light of current circumstances), and the relationship between Emperor Showa and the military, the Cabinet and the Army General Staff, Prime Minister Humimaro Konoe and Foreign Minister Yōsuke Matsuoka, and Army Minister Tojō Hideki and the Army General Staff.
If the United States had conducted sufficient intelligence activities regarding the centers of power in Japan, such as the relationship between Emperor Showa (Hirohito) and the military, the relationship between the Cabinet and the Army General Staff, the relationship between Prime Minister Konoe and Foreign Minister Yōsuke Matsuoka, and the relationship between Army Minister Hideki Tojō and the Army General Staff, the US government may not have proposed conditions that were either unacceptable to the Japanese side, or impossible to implement even if accepted, given the unique relationships between Emperor Showa and the political and military sectors.
Furthermore, if the Japanese side had received accurate information from the center of American power, the Japanese government might not have reacted with shock and rage to the sudden presentation of the Hull Note, and its long list of unilateral and difficult-to-implement conditions, by beginning preparations for war.
The Hull Note was drafted by Comintern spies (it was in the Soviet Union's national interest to pit Britain and America against Japan in the Far East and wear them down). If the Japanese side had been vaguely aware of this (if there had been a secret cooperation system between Japanese and American intelligence agencies), they might have been able to respond differently.
In today's world, life and death depend on intelligence.
However, intelligence organizations have a very bad image in Japan.
The prewar "Tokkō" (Special Higher Police) and postwar "Kōan" (Public Security Intelligence Agency) are strongly associated with the image of "bad guys."
The average Japanese person has the impression that the prewar "Special Higher Police (called "Tokkō") and the postwar "Public Security Intelligence Agency (called "Kōan")" were violent organizations that gathered together only cunning and misbehaving people, targeted and surveilled Japanese people, and oppressed the Japanese people and Japanese society.
Not a single member of the "Special Higher Police" was punished (disciplined) after the war. Apparently, the Americans (not the Allied forces) considered them useful for their "anti-communist" purposes, so they were all acquitted and disappeared, largely anonymous, without a trace (perhaps they just infiltrated somewhere and continued committing the same crimes again?).
The same can be said about the postwar "Public Security Intelligence Agency."
In Japan, people remain afraid to say anything about the postwar "Public Security Intelligence Agency." The media also reports nothing. It is a black box organization.
I believe that Japan's version of the CIA will be an even more twisted and insidious version of the Kōan, an even more vicious version of the Stasi.
In other words, I predict that it will be an organization that is a combination of the Kōan and the Stasi.
I fear that it will create a group of people who, under the premise that anti-Japanese sentiment is not a crime, will bare their fangs at their own people and will feel no qualms about committing any kind of despicable crime.
END
To strengthen government intelligence, the LDP holds its first meeting... supporting discussions toward the creation of a "National Intelligence Agency."
Published November 14 (Fri) 21:37
https://news.yahoo.co.jp/articles/8d1deb46acd052ebbcaca3f703527c3719ada99e
Excerpt
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Policy Research Council Chairman Kobayashi (center right) delivers a speech (at LDP headquarters on the 14th)
On November 14, 2025, the LDP held the first meeting of its "Intelligence Strategy Headquarters" at party headquarters to strengthen the government's intelligence (information gathering and analysis) functions. The government plans to establish a "National Intelligence Agency" to serve as a command center, and the LDP will also organize issues and support discussions.
At the meeting, Kobayashi, Chairman of the Policy Research Council, who has been appointed as head of the headquarters, stated that strengthening intelligence functions is essential to ensuring national interests, and emphasized that "it will enable us to formulate more precise strategies in diplomacy and security."
He listed the following as issues to be considered:
〈1〉 strengthening the government's command center functions;
〈2〉 drastically strengthening external intelligence-gathering capabilities;
〈3〉 establishing a system to prevent foreign interference.
At the first meeting, former Director-General of the National Security Secretariat, Kitamura Shigeru, explained the current situation and issues surrounding Japan's intelligence system. Attendees expressed opinions on the need for strengthening functions and how human resources should be developed.
Strengthening intelligence functions is one of the signature policies of the Takaichi administration. The coalition agreement between the LDP and the Japan Restoration Party clearly states that a National Intelligence Agency will be established during next year's ordinary Diet session.
The Strategic Headquarters will discuss the specifics of the National Intelligence Agency's authority and functions and compile recommendations.
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Last updated: 11/14 (Fri) 10:47 PM
Yomiuri Shimbun Online
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The government's true colors are showing.
■Currently, public safety and security information is handled by the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office, the Public Security Bureau, the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Defense. A bill to centralize and oversee these functions is scheduled to be submitted to next year's ordinary Diet session.
This is the same move as the creation of the Ministry of Home Affairs to prepare for war.
■Ministry of Home Affairs:
Disbanded and abolished by GHQ after the war. Prefectural Special Higher Police were subordinate organizations.
It also led and supervised the national movement during the Total National Mobilization Movement. It was the highest government agency.
The Total National Mobilization Movement was a militaristic policy implemented by the Imperial Japanese Government in September 1937 (Showa 12) to suppress public discontent and encourage cooperation in the war effort, as the Sino-Japanese War intensified and increased the burden on people's lives.
The government established the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and the Intelligence Bureau. This was a policy to control people's lives and thoughts.