NICHOLAS AND ALEXANDRA

 Lunes, 20 de octubre de 2025: 

 This night, I watched the following film.

　Connected to a SHARP AQUOS, recorded on a USB HDD, broadcast on June 27, 2021, from 0:00 to 3:10, NHK BS Premium, Premium Cinema "Nicholas and Alexandra" (Nicholas and Alexandra, subtitled, English, 1971, UK).

 I stopped playback at "Intermission." I decided to watch the remaining half later.

Martes, 21 de octubre de 2025: 

 This night, I watched the rest of the above-mentioned "Nicholas and Alexandra." I watched about the remaining half, starting with "Intermission."

 A true British film. A masterpiece. I watched the film wondering, "How is Nicholas II portrayed in a British film made during the Cold War?"

 The building's interior, furnishings, and clothing were also magnificent. I think this was possible only in Britain, where there are so many grand aristocratic mansions. Building such a large film set for a movie is both physically and financially difficult. That said, there's no way they would let them use the Kremlin.

 However, unlike the White House, which is open to the public and even allows filming in the Oval Office, we don't know what the interior of the Kremlin was like at the time, so historical accuracy is limited and some imagination is likely involved.

 Tlotsky, Lenin, Witte, Rasputin, and Nicholas II all look so similar to the real people that I was impressed, thinking, "They managed to gather so many actors together." Of course, it's not just about facial resemblance; they also need to be top-notch actors to be chosen for leading roles in such a historical epic.

 Since the original language is English, it can feel a little strange when watching with subtitles, but that's probably unavoidable. 

 Even if the Soviet Union had been allowed to make such a blockbuster film at the time, it would likely have been biased (as in China, North Korea, and South Korea, where the government would likely have provided funding, either directly or indirectly), and (like the dramas mass-produced in China and South Korea and distributed virtually free all over the world) it would likely have been a parade of unfunny distortions of historical facts, "myths" to incite and brainwash the public, outrageous exaggerations and delusions, and a dark past to justify the current political system and power structure.

 I don't want to give away any spoilers, so I will generally refrain from mentioning anything related to the plot.

 The film begins during the Battle of Port Arthur during the Russo-Japanese War, with Russia debating whether to abandon Port Arthur and retreat, or to hold out against the "third-rate" Japanese army.

 Although it's not mentioned in the film, at this point, it was impossible for the Russian army to "withdraw." The only option available was "surrender."

 In the film, the Tsar insists on holding on to the Port Arthur fortress, against the advice of military experts and the Prime Minister, giving the impression of being stubborn and rigid, but if Russia had abandoned Port Arthur, there was a risk of further defeat. The Tsar's decision to hold out until the arrival of the Baltic Fleet was not necessarily wrong at this point.

 The problem was the decade following the end of the Russo-Japanese War.

 Lenin realized after the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War that an autocratic tsarist state could not win a modern war against a modern state that had introduced a constitutional monarchy (I read this somewhere in a book by Lenin I read a long time ago. I forget the title, but I think it was an Iwanami Bunko edition). Nicholas II was bound by traditional thinking, and it would have been difficult for the Tsar to accept the introduction of a "constitutional monarchy" voluntarily or by succumbing to internal political pressure, so the best he could do was open the Duma.

 Even after that, due in part to the political intervention of Rasputin and Tsar's wife, there were continued political errors of judgment. While there were times when his "doting husband" side backfired and led to the worst possible outcome, it cannot be denied that his adherence to traditional policies lacked the flexibility to compromise with rapidly changing realities.

 As a result, Russian politics lacked a political apparatus capable of aggregating the interests of the vast lower classes of society and reflecting them in national politics.

 In peacetime, Russia could get by on the "mercy of the Tsar," but it was unable to adapt to the wartime mobilization system required for modern wars against major powers. It was unable to create a modern wartime economy or to establish a modern food rationing system.

 Wars waged by medieval autocratic states were fought by "mercenaries" recruited by "houses" (such as the Habsburgs), and because they were based on religious, traditional, and psychological relationships of master and servant (loyalty), even if a "house" was defeated in a war, it was rare for a revolution to immediately destroy it.

 However, in modern wartime mobilization, the government forcibly mobilizes the "masses" and semi-forces "workers" to work. This involves an economic exchange relationship (the concept of monetary compensation) based on bread, butter, and milk. There's a scene in the film where a group of old women risk their lives to attack a bakery's back yard, but under an imperial autocratic regime, such people could not be included in society.

 This led to anger and hatred directed at the imperial family due to their poverty, and they were seen as brutal "tyrants." Because soldiers were also recruited from the "masses," this created a rebellious mentality. This became the social foundation for revolution and was an indirect reason for Lenin and his allies' success in manipulating the masses.

 There's a scene where the emperor personally sees his soldiers off at the train station, putting his arm around them and calling them "my friend," but in times of hardship, they would seek "bread" rather than the emperor's mercy. There are limits to how much traditional loyalty can be used to get people to fight.

 Stalin was aware of this, and in order to prevent soldiers from deserting, he set up firing squads to shoot at his own troops from behind, killing a considerable number of them (naturally, the exact number of casualties is unknown).

 On the other hand, given the circumstances at the time, it is difficult to say that Nicholas II's judgment was entirely wrong.

 If Kerensky had accepted support from the United States and Britain (especially the introduction of American capital), he would have been able to hold out on the Eastern Front and wear down Germany. Kerensky likely wanted to avoid being subjected to the political and economic influence of the United States and Britain after the war, but this was also a misjudgment.

 If he had accepted American aid, he might have been able to become a "victorious nation" even if he had not been able to win a direct battle against Germany.

 Stalin was able to defeat Nazi Germany thanks to American support through Lend-Lease (Roosevelt was surrounded by Comintern spies and was to an extent manipulated by the Comintern; the same can be said for the Hull Note; Venona Papers). It would have been difficult for the Soviet Union to defeat Germany's overwhelming military power alone.

 A series of misfortunes arose: the influence of Rasputin, his wife's mental health issues, the hemophilia of their fifth child, a boy, and the sudden declaration of war by his wife's (and Empress's) father, the German Emperor (a situation very similar to Stalin's actions shortly after the start of Operation Barbarossa).

 Japan fought a fierce battle against Russia under the leadership of Nicholas II, but I don't think he was the type of person who would be considered a "brutal" or "tyrant."

 When the Otsu Incident occurred, high-ranking officials in the Meiji government were in a panic. It caused a huge uproar in Meiji Japan.

 This was because, in the sense of the time, assassinating the crown prince of an absolute monarchy was directly linked to war. In a modern nation, even if the "son" of the president was killed, mobilizing the entire nation and immediately declaring war would be both procedurally and psychologically impossible. However, in the imperial autocracy of the time, an attack on the crown prince was an attack on his "family," and since "family" = "state," it amounted to a preemptive attack against the state.

 High-ranking officials in the Meiji government pressured the court to execute the police officer who shot the crown prince. Regardless of the reality, Japan had at least managed to appear like a "modern state," so it was impossible for government officials to apply "pressure" openly. However, they resorted to some nasty behind-the-scenes maneuvering, determined to get the police officer the death penalty at all costs.

 Long ago, when I read documents from that time, I thought, "What pathetic people!" But that's because I'm from the post-World War II era.

 Under Japan's "modern criminal code" enacted in the Meiji era (which has been revised many times, but is still essentially the same today), the crown prince's injuries were minor, so a death sentence would have been unthinkable.

 I read this book in the library a long time ago after the incident, so I've forgotten the title, but it said that the Crown Prince (later Nicholas II) neither resented nor hated Japan, but rather seemed to be wondering why everyone was making such a fuss (I forget whether I read a diary or letter written by himself, or a document written by an aide of the Crown Prince's words).

 From this behavior, he doesn't seem like the type of person who would explode in anger and become driven by a desire for revenge, becoming a raging "tyrant."

 Although the Tsar did not personally order the indiscriminate killings on Bloody Sunday, it can also be said that he handled the aftermath incorrectly.

 Today, Russia should have learned a lesson from the above events. From the perspective of Russia's current president, it seems that "Ukraine, its culture, and its people have never existed. They have always been just a part of Russia." Therefore, he considers this to be an internal issue for his own country (Russia), and is conducting a "special operation" rather than a "war." (Although there has been no declaration of war under international law, in his view, since it is a domestic issue, it is a "legal" act of combat.)

 In reality, from the Russian president's perspective, Ukraine is an economically backward, politically corrupt country where a comedian became president, and where the majority of its citizens want to leave and emigrate to the United States or Germany (despite the resulting high level of English proficiency and an abundance of people with specialized knowledge in areas such as computers). It seems that he thought that because it is a useless country, it could be easily crushed.

 In fact, Ukraine has lost its strategically important territory, Crimea, to Russia with ease. Neither the Ukrainian president nor the Obama administration was able to do anything. Some around the world were impressed by the Russian president's lightning-fast feat, even praising his "genius"-like skills (Trump also praised Putin as a "genius").

 However, from the perspective of Western countries, Ukraine is a relatively more advanced modern state than Russia, and its president is chosen through democratic elections. Former or current presidents do not poison political opponents or kidnap and bury people who report or behave in an inconvenient way. The same person does not vote multiple times at the same polling station.

 Russia's urban areas are permeated with a mass consumer society, and life is no different from that of residents in developed Western countries. However, compared to Ukraine, there is no denying that the country is politically backward.

 Russia has established an extremely sophisticated wartime economy, which has weakened the effects of Western economic sanctions. Therefore, for the time being, it is unlikely that the Russian people will fall into poverty, including in healthcare, welfare, and education, which would cause an explosion of discontent.

 However, no matter how much they stir up excitement by holding events with large numbers of fake attendees, there are limits to mobilizing the public for war out of "loyalty to Russia." There's a possibility that more people will begin to question "what and who this war is for." It's impossible for the Russian government to completely monitor the internet (although the US apparently monitors social media and email), and it's also impossible to kill everyone who is inconvenient.

 On the other hand, the Ukrainian people are not fighting out of "loyalty," but to protect their country and survive today. This difference cannot be ignored when maintaining a political, military, and economic wartime mobilization system.

 A country that embraces modern values ​​like freedom and democracy cannot be taken over so easily.

 When Russia invaded Ukraine, it made most people around the world keenly aware that "that country has gone back to the way it was. It's a re-creation of Imperial Russia. In the end, that country hadn't changed at all. It no longer shared the values ​​of the West." 

 Even today, many of Russia's current president's actions are difficult to understand, and since we don't know what's going on deep within the Kremlin (which is why rumors are circulating that he's seriously ill and that he's panicking because he has cancer), it's impossible to know what compromise he sees.

 One thing is certain: the lessons of the collapse of Imperial Russia have not been learned.

 On the other hand, it seems unlikely that anyone comparable to Khrushchev or Gorbachev (someone Thatcher would call "someone you can do business with") will emerge from Russia anytime soon. Khrushchev navigated skillfully under Stalin's regime and didn't become a "nail that sticks out" until Stalin's death. Gorbachev also navigated skillfully under Brezhnev's regime and remained out of the spotlight until the Communist Party began to decline. Both men rose to prominence when the time was right.

However, the current Putin regime does not appear to have any such talent lurking behind the scenes. That's what a courageous opposition leader looks like. The former president seems a little unreliable to become the "21st century Gorbachev." Putin has a daughter but no son, and is divorced from his wife, so it seems unlikely that he will be able to build a "Putin dynasty" (Putin empire) like North Korea's "Kim dynasty" (which seems to be modeled after the emperor system) , although he seems to have more than enough assets.

 Furthermore, the "second largest party" in the Russian parliament (the largest opposition party) is still the Communist Party. The West would be in trouble if the Putin regime were to suddenly fall, and the Communist Party were to rise to power and begin making extreme claims.

 The reality is that Western countries have no choice but to make a deal with Putin. Waiting for Putin to grow old and die is not a very good option. This makes the situation difficult.

The End